Abstract

Although two-vote mixed legislative systems have proliferated globally, the factors contributing to split-ticketing in these cases remains poorly understood. Using survey data regarding South Korea's 2008 National Assembly election, this article addresses two questions: Is ticket-splitting in two-vote legislative systems influenced by the timing of one's vote decision and are late deciders more or less rational in their decision to ticket-split than early deciders? Empirical analysis finds that split-ticket voting under various specifications is more likely to be carried out by late deciders. Among split-ticket voters, however, late deciders are more likely to irrationally split their vote.

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