The Timing of Public Policies: Political Budget Cycles and Credit Claiming

Abstract

AbstractWhy do politicians cluster the distribution of benefits in the run‐up to elections? I suggest that credit claiming is an explanation for political budget cycles. Brazilian rules banning credit claiming before elections while allowing the distribution of benefits until Election Day provides an opportunity to differentiate between distribution and credit claiming combined with distribution as an engine that reinforces political budget cycles. Evidence from housing and conditional‐cash‐transfer programs demonstrates that officials expand these programs before the credit‐claiming ban and halt expansion after the ban yet prior to Election Day. Drawing on social media and qualitative data, I show that politicians use credit claiming to convey information about their competence and attribution. Distribution without attribution reduces the likelihood of political budget cycles compared to distribution with attribution, which together reinforces pre‐election expansion of policy benefits. I rule out rival explanations of clientelism and party favoritism.