The threat of litigation and voluntary partner/manager turnover in big six firms

Abstract

In debates over tort reform, various sources (e.g., Berton 1991, p. A1, 1994, p. A1; Dalton et al. 1994, p. 56) have asserted that the threat of litigation contributes to the voluntary departure of partners and managers from the Big Six public accounting firms, possibly detracting from their auditing capabilities. Others have countered that increased legal liability would improve audit quality by encouraging greater care in the conduct of audits (e.g., Kothari et al. 1988, p. 322). Both arguments seem plausible, but there is little systematic evidence to support a link between litigation and turnover. Our study attempts to help fill this void. We report the results of an empirical analysis of unique questionnaire data obtained from former partners and managers who left Big Six firms during the period 1990–1992. A substantial portion of the respondents indicated that the threat of litigation influenced their turnover decisions. Having made personal payment because of litigation was significant in explaining the importance of the threat of litigation in turnover decisions. Further, path analysis revealed evidence of indirect effects of the threat of litigation on work/non-work commitments and control/supervision, which in turn affected turnover. Both the act of having made personal payment as a result of litigation and the prospect of doing so in the future were significant in explaining respondents' decisions to leave public accounting altogether. Our findings support the public accounting profession's arguments of linkages between turnover and the threat of litigation.