Abstract

In this article, I examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Søren Kierkegaard’s novel Fear and Trembling and in which way (if any) it can be explanatory. Kierkegaard’s preference for pseudonyms, indirect communication, Socratic interrogation, and performativity are identified as features that provide the narrative with its thought experimenting quality. It is also proposed that this literary fiction functions as a Socratic–theological thought experiment due to its influences from both philosophy and theology. In addition, I suggest three functional levels of the fictional narrative that, in different ways, influence its possible explanatory force. As a theoretical background for the investigation, two accounts of literary cognitivism are explored: Noël Carroll’s Argument Account and Catherine Elgin’s Exemplification Account. In relation to Carroll’s proposal, I conclude that Fear and Trembling develops a philosophical argumentation that is dependent on the reader’s own existential contribution. In relation to Elgin’s thought, the relation between truth and explanatory force is acknowledged. At the end of the article, I argue that it is more accurate to see the explanatory force of Fear and Trembling in relation to its exploratory function.

Highlights

  • The aim of this article is to examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of SørenKierkegaard’s novel Fear and Trembling (Kierkegaard 2013)

  • I intend to explore in what way this specific kind of thought experimenting can be considered to be explanatory

  • The typical philosophical or scientific thought experiment is constituted by a short fictional narrative that provides evidence in favor of or against a theory, illustrates abstract states of affairs or fulfills specific functions within a theory

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Summary

Introduction

The aim of this article is to examine the possible thought experimenting qualities of Søren. The subtitle to Repetitions (Kierkegaard 1983), published the same year as Fear and Trembling, is, “A Venture in Experimental Psychology” (“Et forsøg i den experimenterande psychologie”) and in Stages on Life’s Way (Kierkegaard [1845] 1988), the section Guilty/Not Guilty is referred to as “A Psychological Experiment.” The aim of such operations was, according to Kierkegaard, to construct imaginary scenarios that generated insights into the human psyche that were unattainable by direct empirical observation. Watts (2016) refers, for instance, to Kierkegaard’s essay Philosophical Fragments (Kierkegaard [1844] 1985) as a thought experiment that explores whether the essential truth of Christianity lies beyond the limits of human understanding He proposes that, here, Kierkegaard makes a distinction between two kinds of thinking: aesthetic–intellectual and ethico–religious thinking.

Pseudonymity and Indirect Communication
Four Alternative Versions of Abraham’s Response to God
The Existential Contribution of the Reader
The Knight of Faith and the Tragic Hero
Faith as Silent Inwardness
Analysis of Fear and Trembling
The Possible Thought Experimenting Quality of Fear and Trembling
The Relation between Thought Experimenting and Literary Fictions
The Argument Account of Noël Carroll
Fear and Trembling in Light of Carroll’s and Elgin’s Account
39. New York
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