Abstract

Abstract Tiie degate on how to conduct the nuckar arms race was at r()(Jt a debate about foreign policy. \Vhcthcr or not either side had something approximating to a first-strike capability mattcn:d only if it was fdt that the dynamics of international affairs Wl.H: pushing the superpowers in exorably to the brink of war or that alliance commitments depended on a readiness to take the highest risks. Although the ideas or limited war and arms control allowed members or the liberal wing or the Democratic Party to appear responsible realists rather than naive idea lists, they tended to doubt that the Soviet Union was really contemplating total war, and they suspected that by showing greater fle.,ibility the \Vest could move toward some sort of :iccommodation with the East. lvlorc seriously, they believed that the prcoccup:irion with European geopolitics, the cold w:lr, and the :mns race me:mt tlut the big story of the contcmpor:it)’ era, the snugglcs in the third world for politic:li mdependencc and economic de velopment, w:is being missed.

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