Abstract
How successful was J. S. Mill in reconciling the various elements in his thought which, on his own account, he tried to weave together in the period after he ceased to be a dogmatic Benthamite? This much discussed issue is raised afresh by some recent studies, especially Gertrude Himmelfarb's On Liberty and Liberalism and Paul Feyerabend's Against Method. The former argues that there is a conflict between the Mill of On Liberty and the conception of liberty to be found in his other writings, whilst the latter claims that On Liberty is not only a corrective to Mill's Logic but to all attempts to lay down rules for the conduct of scientific enquiry. Can these versions of the ‘two Mills thesis' be sustained?
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