The Theory-Observation Distinction III The Third Distinction

Abstract

Abstract Here’s a way of drawing the theory-observation distinction that seems to avoid both the devastation of van Fraassen’s distinction and the chancy dependence on empirical results of Fodor’s distinction. Let’s suppose that theories are formulated in such a way that their singular consequences are about the occurrence or non occurrence of events. Van Fraassen, for his part, is willing to admit that statements about objects are intertranslatable with statements about events: “There is a molecule in this place” and “The event of there-being-a-molecule occurs in this place” are merely notational variants (van Fraassen 1980, 58). Let OX be the proposition that an event of type X occurs. If X is the decay of a particle of type A, then OX is the proposition that an A-particle decays. Also let E(T, “X”) be the event (type) that theory T refers to as “X”. If Tis true, then E(T, “X”) = X. For instance, if current particle physics is true, then it’s also true that the event that current particle physics refers to as “the decay of an A-particle” is the decay of an A-particle. But this identity may fail for false Ts. Consider, for example, the false theory that identifies certain types of shimmering reflections with the presence of ghosts. Then, a particular type of reflection may very well be the type of event that this theory refers to as “the presence of a ghost”, but the reflection wouldn’t be a ghost.