The Theory of Legal Cynicism and Sunni Insurgency in Post-Invasion Iraq

Abstract

Arab Sunni attacks and casualties in post-invasion Iraq are poorly explained by static ethnic, religious, or sectarian values involving the acceptability of violence. Alternatively, we elaborate a cultural framing theory of legal cynicism previously used to account for neighborhood variation in Chicago homicides: legal cynicism theory has an unrecognized power to explain collective and interpersonal violence in international as well as American settings. We expand on how “double and linked” roles of state and non-state actors can be used with this theory to analyze the consequences of unnecessary attacks on Arab Sunni civilians by U.S.-led forces and by Iraq military and police forces. Arab Sunnis responded to attacks with a legally cynical cultural framing of the U.S./Coalition invasion and occupation, the new Shia-dominated Iraq state, and its military and police. This post-invasion frame amplification of beliefs about state-based illegitimacy, unresponsiveness, and insecurity made it not only possible but predictable that Arab Sunni insurgent attacks would continue against U.S./Coalition forces and transfer to Shia-dominated Iraq government forces. Thus, violence in Iraq persisted during and despite Surge and Awakening efforts to end the Arab Sunni insurgency.