The Theory of Jazz Music "It Don'T Mean A Thing ... "

Abstract

Even theoretically equipped jazz critics tend to avoid the question, "What is jazz?" Some texts settle for a plurality of "views." I But this does not satisfy the intuition that by the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, a new musical phenomenon with definite features had come into being. Jazz could be defined better in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Usually, this amounts to a list.2 But any such list, however thoughtfully prepared, leaves us with a nagging question: What is it about the interaction of several factors that transforms them into jazz? The ideal definition, in short, ought to be able to explain the unified effect that is created by the various elements that contribute to the making of jazz. This is what underlies the bold essentialism of Andre Hodeir.3 His boldness is matched only by his almost perverse willingness to bruise our pre-analytic intuitions, particularly our sense that jazz has some vital connection with (i) improvisation and (ii) blues tonality. We can learn something by examining his argument. Hodeir's exposition is complicated-and sometimes confused. He does not always cling to his own best insights. Further, his theory is indecisive on one rather fundamental point. For these reasons, I shall have to reconstruct what his argument ought to say. As I interpret Hodeir, he makes a very interesting case for the thesis that jazz is an essentially rhythmic matter. Much of the effort in this essay is devoted to solving problems in working out such a theory, although some space will be left for a consideration of criticisms. Hodeir defends the following negative propositions:4 Jazz music is not defined (i) by any special relationship to tonality, (ii) by its use of special metrical devices, (iii) by a connection with "architecture" (meaning, roughly, "form," e.g., theme-and-variations, sonata-allegro, etc.), (iv) by any fundamental connection with "sound" (matie?re sonore),5 or (v) by its use of improvisation. Hodeir's defense of these negative claims may seem obscure because he's guided by a curious ground-rule regarding necessary and sufficient conditions: If any musical element discoverable in jazz can also be found elsewhere, then it cannot even be part of a definition of jazz.6 Odd as this rule seems, I believe an important insight underlies it. It connects with the idea that a definition of jazz should be a unitary one. We shall examine this idea in the course of a consideration of Hodeir's negative claims.