The Theoretical Function of Democracy in Spinoza and Hobbes

Abstract

In this chapter, Matheron examines the theoretical role played by an appeal to democracy in the political philosophy of Spinoza and Hobbes. The concern is thus not their respective theories of democracy, but rather who references to democracy undergird the theoretical legitimacy of all forms of political sovereignty. For Hobbes’s part, his thinking evolves from first arguing that other forms of sovereignty derive their absolute character from their being derived from democracy to the position that other forms of sovereignty are not derived from democracy, but nonetheless are constituted and the same way, ensuring they remain absolute. Spinoza, for his part, move from this latter position to the claim that all other forms of sovereignty are derived from democracy and therefore are never absolute. For Spinoza, right is coextensive with power, which in turn means that the ‘transfer’ of power from the multitude to a sovereign is never carried out once and for all, but rather is carried out at each moment, leaving open the possibility that the multitude could overturn the sovereign to the precise extent that they have the power to do so.