The Thai–Cambodian Border Dispute: An Agency-centred Perspective on the Management of Interstate Conflict

Abstract

Armed conflict between states in Southeast Asia has been relatively-rare, especially since 1979. The most recent exception to this pattern was a border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand that turned violent in 2008 and remained militarized for more than three years. Existing studies of this long-standing conflict have concentrated on explaining upsurge in violence between 2008 and 2011, but have tended to ignore that fighting was quickly contained each time clashes occurred. This article provides a different perspective and asks how dispute was managed short of large-scale armed violence. To answer this question, author adopts an agency-focused perspective that emphasizes role of critical actors who worked to de-escalate conflict. Based on field research conducted in Cambodia and Thailand, as well as consulting primary and secondary sources, author adopts a narrative that revisits critical periods from 1950s onwards and argues that relevant actors in both Cambodia and Thailand had long-standing incentives to avoid escalating conflict. Two elements were critical: first, crucial actors including Cambodian and Thai bureaucrats, diplomats and members of security and intelligence services developed an understanding of problems inherent in defining their land border; and second, establishment of personal contacts, even in context of antagonistic relations. Together, these factors created possibilities for Cambodia and Thailand to cooperate in managing conflict and increased willingness of both sides to exercise self-restraint. Keywords: Cambodia, Thailand, border conflict, Preah Vihear temple. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is commonly recognized as a successful model of institutionalized interstate cooperation midway towards forming a security community of states that do not fight each other. (1) Yet, in early 2011 Southeast Asia witnessed what a senior Thai diplomat called the first war between two members of ASEAN. (2) Following months of diplomatic strain and sabre-rattling over unresolved border issues, Thai and Cambodian security forces clashed in early February 2011, leaving at least eight persons dead and close to a hundred military, police and civilians injured. (3) The ensuing stand-off led to renewed fighting in mid-April. Over course of one week, both sides exchanged mortar and heavy artillery fire, and with no solution in sight, Cambodia referred most critical aspect of border dispute--the stretch of land adjacent to temple of Preah Vihear--to International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. As Court began its deliberations, relations between two countries soon returned to normal. The ICJ delivered its judgement in November 2013 and tensions have not flared anew, although ruling on Preah Vihear border provided only a partial solution to one of several outstanding border problems between Cambodia and Thailand. (4) The Thai-Cambodian dispute reinforced notion that conflicts within Southeast Asia's incipient security community tend to be shelved rather than resolved on battlefield. (5) The 2011 clashes prompted a new interest in border conflict and its impact on Thai-Cambodian relations. Since conflict erupted, at least four doctoral theses, (6) two single-authored monographs (7) and about a dozen book chapters and articles in peer-reviewed academic journals have been written on topic in English. (8) One can also add an extensive list of government publications and media commentary. In essence, existing literature provides ample empirical detail on border dispute and other problems that bedevilled relations between two countries. (9) However, because these analyses focus mainly on explaining conflict, existing literature has largely ignored fact that despite widely cited hostility, (10) historical animosity (11) and underlying distrust (12) between two countries, they have succeeded in managing their border dispute short of large-scale armed conflict. …