THE TESTING OF WASHINGTON SYSTEM WITH JAPANESE INITIATIVES AND THE FAILURE OF DETERRENCE IN EAST ASIA

Abstract

The study aims to assess the Japanese challenge to the status quo established with the “Washington System” during the interwar period under the American leadership from the perspective of deterrence. Deterrence is based on cost/benefit calculations. When the cost of challenging the status quo is greater than the potential benefit, the challenger prefers to maintain the status quo. At this point, satisfaction with the status-quo and credibility are two determining factors of deterrence success and sustainability of the status quo. The changes in power asymmetry in East Asian regional order since the second half of 19 th century caused the fall of the Chinese Empire, the rise of Japan, and the opening of the regional states to Western-style international relations. However, the Washington system established under the US leadership after World War I (WWI) created a dissatisfied Japan with the status-quo in the region. As its capabilities increased, Japan began to take challenging initiatives shaking the Washington System. Due to the isolationist policy of the US after the WWI, US’ responses toward Japanese aggression were minimal and shied away. Thus, it made the US in the eyes of Japan as a status-quo power having retaliatory capacity but not the intention. This study shows that the main reasons for the deterrence failure on the road to the Pearl Harbor attack were the dissatisfaction of Japan with the status-quo and Japan’s misperception of American credibility. As a result, the war became a more beneficial option in Japan’s eyes despite its unacceptable costs, and deterrence failed.