Abstract
I propose a non-Humean theory of causation with tendencies as causal connections. Not, however, as necessary connexions: causes are not sufficient, they do not necessitate their effects. The theory is designed to be, not an analysis of the concept of causation, but a description of what is the case in typical cases of causa- tion. I therefore call it a metaphysical theory of causation, as opposed to a semantic one.
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