Abstract
The purpose of this manuscript is to critically examine the legal findings of the Tagliavini Report in hope of contributing to the debate on its principal conclusions. The establishment of an independent fact-finding commission to explore the origins and course of the conflict marked the first time in its history that the EU, key mediator in concluding the Georgia-Russia conflict's ceasefire, intervened actively in an armed conflict. The author, disparate from the Fact-Finding Mission, does not find Georgia to have the right of self-defence in regard of attacks by Ossetian secessionist forces preceding the Russian invasion. The author argues, analogously to the Tagliavini Report, that Georgian offensive on Tskhinvali in South Ossetia represented an excessive use of force which violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In regards to the central issue, the author contends that the Russian military intervention in Georgia on 8 August 2008 following Georgian offensive on Tskhinvali was not justified under the scope of reinforcing its peacekeeping force, or on the grounds of humanitarian intervention, intervention by invitation, or protection of citizens. Distinct from the Tagliavini Report, this manuscript reaches the conclusion that Russia was neither entitled to invade Georgia for protecting its peacekeeping contingent that comprised part of an international peacekeeping force.
Highlights
CaAsreticlNeoteIn the prevailing opinion, Georgia has been held liable for initiating the ‘five-day’ international armed conflict against Russia in August 2008
This paper aims to deconstruct the controversial legal narrative,[2] in hope of contributing to the debate on whether the Russian Federation had the right under international law to invade Georgia on 8 August 2008.3 In this light, this study is divided into four main chapters; the first three chapters address the state of affairs in South Ossetia prior to 8 August so as to provide the basis for examining the legality of the Russian invasion on 8 August in the fourth chapter
The Georgian authorities, as well as their South Ossetian counterparts, were entitled to undertake only such operations that would not breach Article 2(4) or that would conform with the exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of force stated in the United Nations (UN) Charter
Summary
Georgia has been held liable for initiating the ‘five-day’ international armed conflict against Russia in August 2008. As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has noted: ‘When you get a war involving a group of States, you get a chain of events in which it is very difficult to say which action comes first, and visà-vis whom.’[1] This characterization describes fittingly the situation on 7/8 August in South Ossetia as well as the days leading up to the escalation of the conflict. This analysis addresses the events leading up to the outbreak of the August 2008 armed conflict in Georgia with focus on the legality of the Russian intervention in the South Ossetia conflict. The following chapter provides an overview of its principal conclusions
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