Abstract
The Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework was used by British forces in Helmand Province to attempt to quantitatively understand how best to combat the insurgency in Afghanistan – but it was soon discontinued. David Wilson and Gareth Conway examine why this method fell out of favour, the specific lessons learnt, and what methodologies may be more appropriate.
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