The Symbolic Element in Belief: An Alternative to Tillich

Abstract

THE SYMBOLIC ELEMENT IN BELIEF: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TILLICH PAUL TILLICH believed that revelation, because it is consistent, could he interpreted in a systematic form. Indeed Tillich's own theological system is so consistent that he could successfully claim that " each part contains the whole from a different perspective." (168) 1 Any criticism, therefore, of one part of this system implicitly contains a criticism of the entire system. The present critique will focus precisely on the question of what type of relationship is established when one thing is contained in another thing. The particular point of entry will be the ontological status of beliefs as symbolic expressions of the ultimate. No attempt will be made to show that Tillich's position on belief is either inconsistent or mistaken within his own system. Instead, his position will be criticized insofar as it is a consistent and correct embodiment of a system that is itself questionable. Although Tillich saw each part of his system as containing the whole, he insisted on an opposite relationship between the mediums of revelation and that which is revealed. Not merely is revelation never to be confused with its historically and culturally conditioned expression, but such confusion of the two things would be idolatrous. (1110) This principle Tillich applied consistently and thoroughly: he distinguished God from anything that is said about God; he separated Jesus as Jesus from Jesus as the Christ. In the end Tillich drew a line between any belief and that which is believed. Tillich's system is of immense value in itself. The critical problems that it raises, however, need to be addressed. 1 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, 1957, 1963). References will appear in parentheses, Roman volume number followed by Arabic page nnmber. 449 450 DENNIS DOYLE According to Tillich's system, the ontological status of anything that exists is ambiguous. All that participates in being is finite; at the same time, however, that which is finite is both potentially infinite and threatened with nonbeing. All that exists is engaged in the quest for the New Being in which essential being conquers existential being under the conditions of existence. (IIllS-19) Life is the actualization of potential being. (III130) . Anything that exists participates in being to the extent that it strives toward its essence which simultaneously affirms its infinite potential and negates its finitude. And so, for Tillich, the self-affirmation of finite existence is a choice against being, while the self-negation of finite existence is the choice of being and the embracing of infinite potential. Thus that which exists both is and is not: in the affirmation of finite existence, it is not; in the negation of finite existence, it is. Tillich's conception of creation and fall corresponds with his ontology. These doctrines do not describe temporal events. Rather, they describe the relation between God and the world. (!2$!t) Two opposite positions that have emerged historically concerning this relation are, on the one hand, the doctrine of total depravity and complete separation from God, and, on the other hand, the belief that the world is basically good but partially turned away from God. Tillich attempts to transcend this dichotomy. For him life is neither basically evil nor basically good; it is ambiguous. Symbols, according to Tillich's system , are ontologically ambiguous. This is especially true of religious symbols. Religious symbols are "double-edged." (1240) Like everything else in Tillich's ontology, they are composed of both finite and infinite elements. The essential being of a symbol acts as a gateway to the infinite. The existential selfhood of a symbol is structurally separate from its essential being, and only in the negation of its existential selfhood does a symbol achieve its essential function. Symbols live existentially as the expression of a relation between the finite and the ultimate. Because of its finite elements, a symbol can also die. No symbol is in itself ultimate. But this THE SYMBOLIC ELEMENT IN BELIEF 451 is not, Tillich claims, to say that symbols are not true. They have a two-fold participation in truth: they have truth to the extent that they are adequate...