Abstract

Since 1973 studies of underground siting for nuclear power plants have been going on in Sweden. War protection, being the primary aim in accordance with the instructions, the first containment study has lead to siting in rock or in a pit. Rock siting gives better war protection than pit siting and also has less effect on the landscape, the cost being about equal. The second study was aimed at surveying the advantages and disadvantages of a rock sited 1000 MW BWA nuclear power plant from a reactor safety standpoint, compared to a plant above ground. Based on the instructions and considerations within the study group, the following criteria for the plant design have been established. (1) The plant should be designed to give protection against external acts of war with conventional weapons. (2) The plant should have a safety level equal to that of an above ground plant. It should fulfil the demands set by the authorities for above ground plants with respect to normal operation and accidents. No accidents that can be dealt with above ground may be permitted to result in more serious consequences, nor may they have a higher probability in a plant sited in rock. (3) The design of the plant should moreover utilize the possibilities of improving the safety afforded by rock siting. The criterion about war protection leads to siting in rock or pit, as shown in a previous CDL study. The study group has concentrated its work on rock siting. To clarify the two other criteria, the study group has outlined four alternative designs of a rock sited plant: (1) Reactor with complete pressure suppression (PS) containment placed together with central auxiliary equipment in a closed cavern with 48 m span that is placed about 50 m under the rock surface. (2) Reactor with complete PS containment placed together with auxiliary equipment in similar cavern as alternative (1) but open to the atmosphere. (3) Reactor placed ment. (4) Reactor placed in a containment directly surrounded by the rock. Auxiliary equipment placed in separate caverns. Standardization and quality improvement today are preferred to choosing new systems and more advanced technical solutions. Also, considering the desire from a safety standpoint, a rock sited plant should as much as possible exploit established technology. A consequence of the desire to use established technology is that the reactor cavern should be open to the atmosphere. If the cavern is closed, certain pipe rupture accidents may give overpressures that are difficult to master without large design alterations. The criterion about utilizing the possibilities for increasing the safety leads the interest to extreme improbable accidents, where certain advantages seem to be attainable with rock siting. A tight, strong cavern around the reactor would thereby be an ideal solution. This design appears, however, difficult to combine with the criterion about equal safety level as above ground. This criterion that controls the safety in the circumstances normally considered for nuclear power plants must be satisfied primarily, since extreme accidents have such very low probability. The tight cavern has therefore had to stand back for the open. The study shows, however, that an open reactor cavern can also be designed to significantly increase the protection of the surroundings in extreme improbable accidents compared to above ground plants. The chosen technical design of the reactor plant demands a cavern with a 45–50 m span. Caverns without strengthening efforts with such spans are used in mines, but have not previously been used for industrial plants. Studies of the stability of such caverns show that a safety level is attainable corresponding to the safety required for the other parts of the nuclear power plant. The conditions are that the rock is of high quality, that necessary strengthening measures are taken and that careful studies of the rock are made before and during the blasting, and also during operation of the plant. The third study was delivered to the government in 1977. One part in this study is going deeper in certain questions (safety, operation, maintenance, sabotage, war protection, cost and decommissioning). Another part aims to a broader view of risks and consequences in peace and war and also advantages and disadvantages of nuclear power plant for district heating.

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