The superordinate self in psychoanalytic theory and in the self psychologies.

Abstract

The concept of the self has been used in several attempts to resolve the epistemological problems of what is subjective and what is objective, what is personal and what is organismic. In addition, it has been used to mediate between the hermeneutic and natural-science approaches to psychoanalytic explanation, between the motivational and causal dimensions of our theory and experience. In the case of Kohut, the self was initially invoked to deal with clinical difficulties associated with the analysis of patients with narcissistic personality disorders more recently, it has become the central article in a "self psychology" that addresses presumed deficiencies in the traditional psychoanalytic picture of psychopathology. But the concept of the self is not suited to be a panacea for resolving theoretical or clinical difficulties. The self as person refers to an entity that is both enduring and changing; it describes continuity in the face of change and change in the face of continuity. Abend (1974) comes closest to capturing this attribute of the self in his image of the tidal beach with a configuration that changes but an essence that remains the same. Eisnitz (1980) evokes something similar in his figure-ground conception of the self-representation. The crux of the matter is that the notion of self-experience includes a variety of phenomena that cannot be contained within a single self-construct--be it normal pathologic, grandiose, or otherwise. As a result of these considerations, I have argued against the use of the self as a superordinate concept in psychoanalytic theory and have focused on the shortcomings of three self psychologies that use the self in this way. I believe that Klein, Gedo, and Kohut all offer the self as a kind of conceptual tranquilizer for the philosophical, theoretical, and clinical dualities that are inherent in psychoanalytic work. Grossman addressed himself to these dualities as far back as 1967 and elaborated on the problems with Simon (1969) in a pathbreaking paper on anthropomorphism in psychoanalysis. Grossman and Simon contended that the controversy about anthropomorphism in psychoanalytic theory pertains to the basic confusion in psychology between meaning and causality. They submitted that until this confusion was dispelled and until some superordinate concept was found that could "encompass both kinds of discourse", attempts to transform psychoanalysis into a general psychology would result in failure.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)