Abstract
I argue for the merits of studying historical moral revolutions to inform moral and political philosophy. Such a research program is not merely of empirical, historical interest but has normative implications. To explain why, I situate the proposal in the tradition of naturalized epistemology. As Alison M. Jaggar and other scholars have argued, a naturalistic approach is characteristic of much feminist philosophy. Accordingly, I argue that the study of moral revolutions would be especially fruitful for feminist moral and political philosophers.
Highlights
Naturalized EpistemologyTheoretical Ambiguities and Feminist Affinities Naturalized epistemology has generated a massive amount of research, in epistemology and feminist philosophy, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of science (e.g., Kuhn 2012)
I argue for the merits of studying historical moral revolutions to inform moral and political philosophy
Moral revolutions are primarily identifiable in retrospect; one cannot be sure whether a current social movement is the beginning of a genuine, widespread change in moral or political consciousness, or one of the many false starts which recur throughout history
Summary
Theoretical Ambiguities and Feminist Affinities Naturalized epistemology has generated a massive amount of research, in epistemology and feminist philosophy, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of science (e.g., Kuhn 2012). Gilligan’s research illustrates all three steps of naturalized epistemology: the identification of clear cases of successful knowing (women’s beliefs about the proper response to a moral dilemma; on this, see Ruddick [1989]); the use of scientific inquiry to generate a descriptive picture of how the beliefs are formed (the account of care-thinking); and the use of the descriptive picture to generate standards for judging beliefs in similar contexts (the criticism of justice-thinking as impoverished). Jaggar (2012, 240) describes the alternative, feminist account of moral justification as consisting in the on-going evaluation of individual actions and social practices by people in actual communities of discourse who collectively construct historically specific ideals, norms and values On this understanding, moral justifications are socially developed and contingently situated; ‘the’ moral point of view loses its transcendent status and becomes not single but multiple, rooted in the social world rather than floating above or outside it. The study of moral revolutions turns out to be both descriptive and normative, empirical and philosophical
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