Abstract

As far as British policy makers were concerned the central issue in European diplomacy since the end of World War I was how to deal with the German problem and the associated question of French security. It was hoped in London that Britain’s adherence to the Treaty of Locarno in 1925 had gone a long way to satisfy French anxieties; anxieties that had to be addressed if the preferred option in London — some revision of the Treaty of Versailles in Germany’s favour — could be tackled. The early 1920s had demonstrated how difficult it was for Britain to persuade France to accept British policy in Europe without some kind of security commitment over and above the somewhat nebulous obligations outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Anglo-American guarantee offered to France during the Paris Peace Conference had lapsed when the United States Senate refused to ratify the Peace treaty with Germany. Further attempts to provide for French security through a bilateral Anglo-French alliance failed due to Lloyd George’s refusal to undertake commitments in Eastern Europe to underpin the Cordon Sanitaire of states around Germany which France had constructed as a makeweight against German revival. Conscious of its global commitments, Britain after 1918 was more anxious to limit its commitments than extend them, especially into areas such as Eastern Europe which were not perceived to be areas of vital British interest.

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