The struggle for recognition and the authority of the second person

Abstract

AbstractIn this introductory paper, I discuss the second‐personal approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social constellation front and center from which they derive the fundamental norms of moral and social life and a social conception of freedom. The second section discusses three points of contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in that the second‐personal approach opts for a narrower conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral accountability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader conception including relations of love, respect, and esteem. Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the interrelation of the I‐thou and the I‐We relationship. Finally, they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for recognition. Whereas the second‐personal approach suggests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a transcendental infrastructure of second‐personal address, the theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of the human form of life.