Abstract
The paper has three parts. First, a survey and analysis is given of the structure of individual rights in the recent EU Directive on data protection. It is argued that at the core of this structure is an unexplicated notion of what the data subject can `reasonably expect' concerning the further processing of information about him or herself. In the second part of the paper it is argued that theories of privacy popular among philosophers are not able to shed much light on the issues treated in the Directive, which are, arguably, among the central problems pertaining to the protection of individual rights in the information society. In the third part of the paper, some suggestions are made for a richer philosophical theory of data protection and privacy. It is argued that this account is better suited to the task of characterizing the central issues raised by the Directive.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
