Abstract
Patronage systems are composed of a social relation (between patron and client), the norms associated with this relation (support, defend, not attack), and network-formation rules (governing the creation of patronage ties). Actors in a patronage system face moral dilemmas when they become obligated to fight on both sides of a conflict, and patronage systems are normatively consistent when these dilemmas can never arise. This paper examines the structure of normatively consistent patronage systems, exploring the logical relationships among norms and between norms and network structure. The paper illustrates how sociologically relevant concerns from deontic logic can be incorporated into network analysis using algebraic methods familiar to network analysts.
Published Version
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