The Structure and Use of Power: A Comparison of Reward and Punishment Power

Abstract

Power-dependence theory and the social exchange framework on which it is based have been restricted to the analysis of rewarding exchanges. The only costs considered have been the rewards foregone from alternative exchange relations. This paper reports the first in a series of experiments studying power use in social exchange when actors have control over both positive and negative outcomes for one another. The relative effects of balance and imbalance in power over positive outcomes (reward power) and power over negative outcomes (punishment power) are compared in a laboratory experiment in which two real subjects and two computerized actors are connected in four-person exchange networks. Analyses of the distribution of exchange between the two real actors found that only imbalance in reward power affected power use. Punishment rarely was used and power use was no greater when punishment power was imbalanced than when it was balanced. An explanation for these findings, which suggests that imbalances in reward and punishment power are likely to affect behavior under different structural conditions, is proposed and hypotheses are offered for future testing.