Abstract

The enduring role of Pakistan's army in both foreign and domestic affairs has long drawn the attention of political scientists. Since its emergence from the partition of the British Indian Empire in 1947, Pakistan has suffered four military coups (in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999), long periods of political instability and a persistent inability to consolidate democratic institutions. At first glance, Pakistan's inability to sustain a transition to democracy is especially puzzling given that India, which also emerged from the collapse of British rule in South Asia, has experienced only a brief bout of authoritarian rule (1975–77) and has managed to consolidate democracy – even though the quality of its democratic institutions and their performance leaves much to be desired. Many scholars have proffered explanations for Pakistan's failure to make a successful transition to democracy. This essay will argue that all the extant accounts are partial and incomplete. It will contend that the roots of Pakistan's propensity towards authoritarianism must be sought in the ideology, organisation and mobilisation strategy of the movement for the creation of Pakistan. Whereas other recent writing on authoritarianism in Pakistan dwells upon the aggregation of power by the military, this essay focuses upon the failure of civilian democratic institutions to fully abandon authoritarianism even when the military is not in power.

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