Abstract

‘The history of Sea power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war’ Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783. Thispaper envisages Chinese String of Pearls' strategy as ageo political tussle between potential Chinese intentions in the Indian Ocean region spreading regional disparity and instability in South Asia. It refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, extending from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. Spreading regional discrepancy along the sea lines, it runs through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the Lombok Strait. The investigation underscores that the neck or the continental mass around which the string hangs includes Pakistan, Tibet, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar. On the seaward side, it starts with Hainan the southernmost Chinese province that has a submarine bay; listening post at Coco, Hainggyi, Kyaukpyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun port facilities in Myanmar; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka; Chittagong in Bangladesh and Gwadar on the Arabian Sea in Pakistan which are referred here as Pearls. In effect, it surrounds India all around its frontiers, except Bhutan. In military-strategic sense, a port facility for the Chinese navy in Myanmar provides it with a direct access to Bay of Bengal without having to voyage through South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca. It shortens the journey to Bay of Bengal by 3, 000 km or 6–7 days. Ports in Myanmar undoubtedly provide China one of the biggest advantages in the region.

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