Abstract
Abstract Following the crisis, macroprudential regulations targeting mortgage-market vulnerabilities were widely adopted, their success often relying on the response of financial intermediaries. We provide evidence from Canada suggesting banks may have behaved strategically to limit the effectiveness of recently implemented mortgage stress tests. Before implementation, borrowers had to prove they could make mortgage payments based on the interest rate specified in the contract. The new tests require borrowers to show they can afford payments based on a typically higher qualifying rate, derived from the mode of 5-year rates posted by the six largest banks. The government’s objective was to cool credit markets, but, since many mortgages are government-insured, the big banks’ interests were not aligned. We find evidence of rate manipulation using a difference-in-differences approach comparing changes in spreads for 5-year mortgages with 3-year spreads, unaffected by the policy. The qualifying rates were lowered encouraging continued borrowing, muting the tests’ impact.
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