The Strategic Logics of Wartime and Post-War Power Sharing

Abstract

Scholars have extensively studied the effects of power sharing agreements, but the dynamics behind their adoption have received scant attention. This neglect is unfortunate, as studying these processes about can shed light both on the nature of the strategic dilemmas that characterize civil war termination and on persistent concerns about bias in studies of power sharing effectiveness. This paper therefore takes an in-depth look at how and why power sharing agreements get adopted, making both theoretical and empirical contributions. First, I propose a typology of power sharing logics — stalemate, token, cynical, and coalitional — that shows how agreements that are similar in form can differ greatly in function. Second, I offer quantitative evidence and qualitative comparisons of a random sample of several dozen power sharing agreements to corroborate the theoretical claims. I conclude by reflecting on the implications of the argument for studies of power sharing effectiveness specifically and the study of civil war termination more broadly.