The strategic effects of non-state shareholders’ governance: based on the perspective of product market performance of state-owned enterprises

Abstract

ABSTRACT Making state-owned capital and state-owned enterprises stronger, better, and larger is the key driving force for comprehensively building a modern socialist country. This paper studies the impact of non-state shareholders’ governance on the product market performance of state-owned enterprises under the background of mixed ownership reform. Our results show that under the control of equity balances, non-state shareholders appointing directors to participate in governance can optimise the strategic decision-making of state-owned enterprises, promote product and service R&D innovation, and improve the operational efficiency of state-owned enterprises, thereby having a positive impact on the product market performance of state-owned enterprises. And this kind of governance effect is more obvious in state-owned enterprises in local control and competitive industries. Further research finds that the strategic effect of non-state shareholders’ governance not only has long-term sustained characteristics but also has a positive spillover impact on the capital market value and operating performance of state-owned enterprises.