The Strange Case of the M/V Julia Woods1

Abstract

ABSTRACT On October 19th, 2001, a crop dusting airplane over-flew the M/V Julia Woods near Rosedale, MS, while spraying a substance directly on the vessel; a commercial tow comprised of 17 open hopper coal barges plying a federal waterway. Starker, there were reports that crewmembers on deck were directly exposed to the substance released. The ensuing response involved many agencies and the owner of the commercial tow. For this incident, the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) and the interagency relationships it describes provided the framework to deal with the “potential terrorist incident.” Discussing the response and management of this provocative act will aid efforts to improve and adapt current practices into the emerging national homeland security strategy for consequence management. The Wall Street Journal discussed in detail Zacarias Moussaoui Atta's actions in the months leading up to the September 11th attack on America, specifically noting his interest in crop dusting aircraft.2 A shocked nation watched as the FAA grounded the airplanes for weeks after the attacks, and the government toiled to assess the validity of the threat. Thus, when an “actual” or “potential terrorist incident” occurred in Marine Safety Office (MSO) Memphis’ territorial area of jurisdiction, the unit, acting as the Federal on Scene Coordinator (FOSC), responded to resolve the consequences of the contemptible act. Due to the absence of reliable information concerning the threat, the U.S. Coast Guard responded using the best operational judgment available and the interagency response tools (tactics, plans and procedures) in the NCP. The M/V Julia Woods’ response provides an excellent opportunity to discuss strengths and weaknesses of the current system. Importantly, the interagency coordination and response proved a flexible effective mechanism for dispatching resources to remote sites to achieve the objectives of the FOSC. Additionally, a unified command (UC) concept contributed to the success of the response as agencies succeeded in meeting public information demands during the response. On the other hand, a lack of a common intelligence system, disjointed plans, and weaknesses in creating and maintaining a common operational picture hampered the motivated interagency team's efforts.