The straits question in the First World War, 1914–18

Abstract

On the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914, the Entente Powers paid little attention to developments in the area of the Turkish Straits.' It was generally believed that the war would not last long and that the decisive battles would be fought on the French and Russian fronts. In so far as the position on the Straits was considered, it was looked at in the general context of Balkan politics and diplomacy. In view of the leading position of influence established by Germany at the Porte, a direct alliance between Turkey and the Entente Powers was unlikely. Turkey might, however, be persuaded to join a Balkan bloc aimed at Austria. If she persisted in supporting the Central Powers, an alliance or confederation of the Balkan powers might be used to divide her from her allies and threaten her on the Straits. Turkey's position on the Straits was extremely vulnerable to an attack mounted by one or more of the Balkan powers, and in particular Bulgaria. The Entente Powers, themselves, were in no position to attack Turkey, either on the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. Russia, who had long expected a European war to provide an opportunity for her to seize Constantinople, was trapped in the position Zhilinsky, Chief-ofStaff of the Russian Army, had foreseen at a Conference held on 21 February 1914: she could not move against Turkey without first defeating Germany.2 In any case, the Russian Black Sea fleet was barely equal to that of Turkey, while its guns were inferior to those of the batteries guarding the Bosphorus.3 Britain could, if need be, and at considerable cost, force the Dardanelles, but she could not ensure that a fleet entering the Sea of Marmora would be supplied with fuel and ammunition.4 The alternative was to seize the Gallipoli Peninsula in order to ensure military control of the narrows.5 In the early days of the war, when all efforts were directed against Germany, neither ships nor men were available for such an operation. France, similarly, was fully engaged transporting troops to the main front in Europe and winning naval supremacy in the Mediterranean. The Entente Powers, therefore, concentrated their efforts on winning the support of the Balkan powers. Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, especially, saw the strategic importance of Bulgaria and made strenuous efforts to win her alliance. Germany, on the other hand, concentrated on winning the support of Turkey. Although she had established a strong position at the Porte, she had not secured a promise of Turkish military support in the event of war, and could not, therefore, count on controlling the Straits. Many influential Germans, indeed, doubted the value of Turkey as an ally. When war appeared inevitable, however, the Kaiser decided, 'for reasons of expediency', to seek an immediate alliance with the Porte.6 He saw that it would be advantageous to Germany to use the Turkish armed forces to attack Russia and Britain in the Near and Middle East. Moreover, active Turkish support would ensure the closure of the Straits and the consequent disruption of the Russian economy. Fearful of their own isolation, the Turks had, themselves, on 22 July