Abstract
AbstractThis chapter contends that Stoics are materialists if, and only if, their theory fulfils the two following conditions: (1) their system must be materialistic monism; and (2) the ‘inferior reality’ must account for the ‘superior reality’, according to the formula that encapsulates Auguste Comte's theory of materialism. It is precisely the case that the Stoics have two principles, god and matter, and this seems to settle the question. However, the issue is more complicated than that, since the two principles are corporeal. Stoic theory of matter seems to be a disguised monism, i.e. a kind of materialism. Matter (as the ‘inferior reality’) accounts for god (as the ‘superior reality’), since god appears to be engendered by matter, which is the only ultimate principle. It is argued that the Stoic doctrine of matter is a reinterpretation of the doctrine of matter or ‘receptacle’ in Plato's Timaeus and of Aristotle's theory of matter. If read like this, the Stoic theory of matter does not appear as materialistic, but nor is it dualist; it is not materialist in the sense that things are not explained by the movements and combination of passive matter, but it is not dualist in the sense that both principles are bodies.
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