The Stick, the Carrot, and the People of Quebec

Abstract

By the winter of 1997, Quebeckers' sentiments toward Canada had hardly changed. If another referendum had been held then, the results would have shown, in all likelihood, the same tragic polarization as on 30 October 1995. public opinion poll conducted for the exclusive use of the Canadian government in October 1996 was released by the Toronto Star on 26 February 1997. It showed that seven Quebeckers out of ten were dissatisfied with the Chretien government's performance concerning the status of Quebec in Canada. Quebeckers nonetheless remained strongly attached to Canada (65 percent) and saddened by the perspective of secession. They would have voted for sovereignty-partnership in the proportion of 50 percent, just about like a year before. How could Quebeckers be at the same time so tied up to their country and risk its dismantlement by voting Yes on sovereignty with an uncertain partnership project? I tried to offer several explanations to that paradox in my article of a year ago. These underlined the fact that Quebeckers have always been both loyal to Canada and keen on their own specific identity. It is to preserve this identity from the threat of a new form of all-embracing Canadianism that so many Quebeckers are contemplating a higher degree of sovereignty than what is allowed by the present constitution of Canada. The Quebec sovereignty movement has always been fed by the inability of the Canadian government and the apparent unwillingness of a majority of Canadians to recognize Quebeckers' specific identity. Prime Minister Jean Chretien is committed to avoiding a repetition of the nerve-racking Referendum of 1995. He moved a resolution in Parliament to recognize Quebec as a and to give it a veto (along with other major provinces) on any future constitutional change. But this action remained mostly symbolic and did not go beyond the Parliament's expression of goodwill. The federal Cabinet was also reshuffled to allow the addition of fresh blood from Quebec. Stephane Dion, a brilliant young political scientist, was appointed Minister of Federal-Provincial Relations: he pledged to have the distinct society recognition enshrined in the constitution. Pierre Pettigrew is another young and intelligent Francophone Quebecker who was called to the Cabinet with Dion in order to assuage his Quebec compatriots and prevent them from voting Yes in another referendum. Most of these efforts of the federal government, however, fell short of addressing the main bone of contention that has remained intact more than a year after the Referendum. Ottawa has used the stick and the carrot, but has lamentably failed to bring forth a conception of Canada that would make room for the people of Quebec. The Stick Contrary to what many had expected, the close Referendum vote did not induce Canadians (including English-speaking Quebeckers) to search for new forms of accommodation with the Quebec government. The Referendum undoubtedly produced a strong shock, but it also has generated more bitterness and hostility than a desire for rapprochement. The expressions of love that were loudly heard in the pre-Referendum rally were transformed into tough utterances in the style of put up or shut up. What was sought was not to pacify Quebeckers but to frighten them away from trying again to achieve sovereignty. Both the federal government and members of various elites in English Canada vowed to prevent another referendum by threatening to review an eventual question, to demand a qualified majority (that is, 60 or 65 percent) and, above all, to disallow in advance any unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) on the part of Quebec. The possibility of partitioning a sovereign Quebec was also seriously considered. All of the latter were part of a so-called Plan B, as if a positive Plan A to keep Quebec in confederation had failed completely. Let us briefly examine these unpleasant perspectives. …