The Status Dilemma in World Politics: An Anatomy of the China–India Asymmetrical Rivalry

Abstract

Abstract The role of status in world politics has become an important research topic. This article examines China–India relations through a new framework for status dilemmas. This article, through a careful comparison of the status dilemma with other models of conflict, clarifies the logic and mechanism of status dilemmas in world politics. In particular, it differentiates between the status competition model and the status dilemma model. The status dilemma entails overestimation of the competitive nature of the status relationship and underestimation of the potential compatibility of the status goal. The article demonstrates that the China–India relationship is not always a zero-sum game, even though its competitive nature is real. Asymmetrical power and motivated reasoning contribute to misunderstanding and misperception. The power asymmetry makes India oversensitive to Chinese actions, and it makes China less sensitive to India’s concerns. Motivated reasoning, based on historical memory and domestic politics, moreover, makes India’s perception of China more negative and competitive than China’s apprehension of India. The status dilemma has broad implications for power politics in the new era which suggest that policymakers should realistically evaluate the challenges of status competition while avoiding deterministic zero-sum thinking.