Abstract
ABSTRACT This article claims that the state and, more precisely, whether the state has a rational-legal or a patrimonial public administration, affects (1) the extent to which democratic standards are met and (2) the costs of abandoning office and the support leaders unwilling to accept electoral defeat can expect to have within the state and their party. Further, this argument is elaborated so as to account for the typical political regime in contemporary Latin America, durable poor-quality democracies. Latin America’s semi-patrimonial states are held to determine this outcome through two mechanisms: selective collusion and political opportunism. The plausibility of the theory about mechanisms is gauged. Additionally, implications for the field of comparative democracy studies are spelled out.
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