Abstract
The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one. Tactical, strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jamaatu Ahl-is-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience.The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration.The LCB has now become a huge human reservoir for jihadist recruitment. The situation in the region is further complicated by the fact that a significant portion of the population supports the Islamists, while the majority of locals are targeted by them and seek to leave their homes.The authors note that the division of BH into separate factions has made it more difficult for the LCB armed forces to conduct anti-terrorist operations, and for the LCB governments to negotiate cease fires or retrieve hostages, although, simultaneously, the split has led to a certain decline in the level of violence and to the weakening of the influence of the Islamists on the socio-economic development in the region.
Highlights
The Islamist group Boko Haram (BH) was founded in the early 2000s and in less than two decades has transformed from a “Nigerian” movement into a regional one
Strategic and ideological differences between the leaders of BH have repeatedly led to its splits into separate factions; the most serious occurred in 2016, when the group split into the Islamic State in West Africa Province and Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad, the latter being still referred to as “Boko Haram” for convenience
The present paper examines the reasons for the splits in BH, the goals and military tactics of the two factions, and the prospects for the development of the security situation in the region of the Lake Chad basin (LCB), where armed conflict is fueled by large-scale poverty, socio-economic and political marginalization, and ineffectiveness of local authorities against the background of intertribal tensions and massive migration
Summary
ЦИТИРОВАНИЕ: Денисова Т.С., Костелянец С.В. (2021) Раскол в «Боко Харам» и его последствия для региона бассейна озера Чад // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. (2021) Раскол в «Боко Харам» и его последствия для региона бассейна озера Чад // Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право. РАСКОЛ В «БОКО ХАРАМ» И ЕГО ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ ДЛЯ РЕГИОНА БАССЕЙНА ОЗЕРА ЧАД. С. 214–230 пировок, взаимоотношения между ними и перспективы развития ситуации в сфере обеспечения безопасности в регионе бассейна озера Чад, где вооруженный конфликт подогревается масштабной бедностью населения, его социально-экономической и политической маргинализацией и неэффективностью местных органов власти на фоне межплеменных противоречий и массовых, в т. Что разделение «Боко Харам» на отдельные фракции усложняет для вооруженных сил стран региона – Нигерии, Камеруна, Нигера и Чада – проведение антитерористических операций, для правительств – переговоры о перемирии или о выдаче заложников, хотя, в то же время, раскол привел к некоторому спаду насилия и к ослаблению влияния исламистов на социально-экономическое развитие региона бассейна озера Чад. Однако с тех пор исламистское движение смогло перегруппироваться и укрепить свои позиции в бассейне озера Чад
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