The ‘speculated’ intervention of the East African Standby Force (EASF) in the Sudan: Lessons from its failed deployment in Burundi

Abstract

ABSTRACT As the crisis in the Sudan unfolded after the overthrow of long time President Omar al-Bashir, the Director of the East African Standby Force (EASF) purportedly made a statement to the effect that the force was ready to intervene should the situation become genocidal. Using the case of its failed intervention in Burundi crisis, this article argues that the EASF deployment in the Sudan would generally not be feasible for reasons including: the government of the Sudan would not consent to the intervention; the ongoing dialogue between the warring parties would preclude any intervention; and the lack of capacity of the force to actually deploy. From its failed deployment in Burundi, these lessons can be discerned: first, that for any deployment of the EASF to be authorised, the policy organs especially of the AU must be aligned in their understanding of the situation. Secondly, where there are alternative means of dealing with the situation, military intervention would not be authorised. Lastly, that consent of the host state must be procured before deployment is undertaken out of respect for the principle of sovereignty.