THE SPECTER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IN UKRAINE: THE NUANCES OF NUCLEAR WAR RISK

Abstract

The essence of Russian security policy is composed of the combined use of conventional and unconventional threats both in war and peacetime. Russia is trying to dominate the process of escalation, especially by frequently threatening nuclear war in Ukraine. It tries to maintain the strategic initiative superiority, thereby forcing its enemies to act under its control. Put differently, by means of manipulating the fear of nuclear war in Ukraine, it tries to prevent other states from directly intervening in the battlefield and to prevent military aid to its enemies from becoming strategic. Methodologically, Russia's effort to gain dominance in escalating tensions through nuclear risk has been studied as a case study. The nuclear risk hinges on uncertainty of nuclear deterrence. The nuances of this often-ignored uncertainty are explained. Since such uncertainty poses credible risk of nuclear war, absolute victory is not possible. No party will get everything it wants, and therefore the only solution is diplomatic compromise through negotiation. The importance and implications of this article lie in the fact that the problems and warnings examined here are likely not only in Ukraine, but also in a possible future crisis over Taiwan and in future conflicts involving nuclear powers.