The Spatial Theory of Voting and the Presidential Election of 1824

Abstract

Theory: We extend research on the spatial theory of voting and the electoral connection by exploring how U.S. House members responded to Electoral College gridlock in the presidential election of 1824. We analyze whether John Quincy Adams's victory was consistent with a spatial-theoretic, ideological model of voting or more closely followed the standard historical account that emphasizes Adams's role in a vote-buying corrupt bargain. Hypotheses: The corrupt-bargain thesis predicts that several states won by Adams in the House ballot swung on votes cast by MCs closer to Andrew Jackson than to Adams. The sincere voting model predicts MCs to vote for the closest candidate. Prediction errors should be most frequent near the cutting line between Adams and his closest opponent. Methods: We use a spatial model of sincere voting as a baseline against which to test the corrupt-bargain hypothesis. We use logistic regression to further test implications from the spatial model. Legislator and candidate preferences are based on transformed Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole 1998), which locate ideal points for House members and the 1824 presidential candidates in a common space. Results: Adams's victory and profile of support were consistent with the sincere voting model and did not support the corrupt-bargain hypothesis. Voting errors involving Adams lie systematically closer to the cutting line than did correct votes. Additional evidence from an examination of lame-duck MCs' subsequent careers and an analysis of the congressional elections of 1826 support our findings.