The Spatial Structure of Perceptual Space

Abstract

It is generally taken for granted that the structure of physical space is relational in character. Objects in physical space have their spatial location solely in virtue of the spatial relations they bear to other objects. This view is usually contrasted with substantival theories which view space as a kind of substance whose existence, as well as certain structural features, are in no way dependent on the objects which occupy it at any particular time.' Given the prevalence of the relational view of physical space, it is natural to suppose that perceptual space has a similar structure. Hence, most philosophers take for granted that perceptual objects have their location in the visual field in virtue of their spatial relations to other objects in the field. This claim, however, has been disputed. Bertrand Russell and Nelson Goodman have both argued that the spatial structure of the visual field is not relational in character. What is particularly striking about their view is that they do not adopt a substantival view of perceptual space but hold, instead, that objects in the visual field have their location by virtue of monadic positional properties. Russell characterizes his theory in the following manner: