The Spanish notion of Lie: Revisiting Coleman and Kay

Abstract

Coleman and Kay (1981) proposed a prototype semantic analysis of the English word lie, arguing that a ‘good’ lie is one containing three basic elements and that utterances lacking one or more element might still be considered lies but to lesser degrees. The present study replicated their questionnaire by applying it to Spanish in Eastern Ecuador. This paper examines whether or not the concept of a lie is different for Spanish and, if so, to what degree and under what semantic prototypical notions. The questions addressed are (1) if lie is a word in Spanish whose definition involves a prototype in the sense discussed by Coleman and Kay; (2) if there is a prototype containing the three elements considered; (3) how participants assign the word lie to reported speech acts; and (4) whether speakers generally agree on the relative weights of semantic elements . The general notion of a prototype is revealed in the Spanish data; however, the order of semantic elements is different from English. It is also argued that pragmatic and cultural considerations are more important, particularly with respect to social lies.