The Soviets m Afghanistan: Can the Red Army Fight A Counterinsurgency War?

Abstract

After nine years of inconclusive combat, the Soviet Union has finally begun withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan. Their lack of military success initially forced them to adopt tactics that were not part of standard Soviet military doctrine and, ultimately, to disengage their forces. In an attempt to discover a more effective counterguerrilla strategy, the Soviets began to re-examine their experiences in crushing the Basmachi revolt, the Central Asian insurgency that lasted from 1918 to 1929. That conflict has been considered by some Soviet military analysts as a good example of how indigenous guerrilla forces could be defeated. However, unlike their campaign in Central Asia (which equally emphasized political, socioeconomic, and military policy tools), the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan emphasized primarily, although not exclusively, a military solution. Operationally, Soviet tactics were predicated upon the use of high-technology weapons (such as helicopter gunships and tactical aircraft) to give them mobility and firepower. In one of numerous parallels to the U.S. experience in Vietnam, the Soviet military discovered that superior technology has only limited application in a counterinsurgency campaign.