The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and Poland: Reassessments and New Findings

Abstract

The overlapping crises in Hungary and Poland in the autumn of 1956 posed a severe challenge for leaders of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). After a tense stand-off with Poland, the CPSU Presidium (as the Politburo was then called) decided to refrain from military intervention and to seek a political compromise. The crisis in Hungary was far less easily defused. For a brief while it appeared that Hungary might be able to break away from the communist bloc, but the Soviet army put an end to all such hopes. Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian revolution, and a degree of order returned to the Soviet camp. Newly-released documents from Russia and Eastern Europe shed valuable light on the events of 1956, permitting a much clearer and more nuanced understanding of Soviet reactions. This article will begin by discussing the way official versions of the 1956 invasion changed and formerly secret documents became available during the late Soviet period and after the Soviet Union disintegrated. It will then highlight some of the most important findings from new archival sources and memoirs. The article relies heavily on the so-called Malin notes and on new materials from East-Central Europe. Both the article and the documents will show that far-reaching modifications are needed in existing western accounts of the 1956 crises.