The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia since the Fall of Saigon

Abstract

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN Southeast Asia derives from the perception of an opportunity to organize support from third world regions against the West and China without risking confrontation in more strategic areas such as Europe. Soviet interest in Southeast Asia dates from the Krushchev and Bulganin tours of Burma, India, and Afghanistan in late 1955. Soviet leaders, previously hostile towards the nonaligned world, attempted to harness nationalism in their drive against the West by extending economic aid and military assistance to nationalist leaders in recently decolonized areas. The policy of supporting nationalist leaders produced few permanent gains for Moscow since nationalism in these areas proved to be an unpredictable and volatile force. Soviet weapons and military credits, for example, enabled Sukarno to prevail during the West Irian campaign by providing him with a credible military force. Sukarno, however, eventually aligned Indonesia with China during the confrontation campaign and any benefits derived by Soviet support of his regime were lost after the attempted coup in Indonesia of September 1965. The collective security proposal for Asia, almost nonchalantly unveiled by Brezhnev during the International Conference of Communists and Workers' Parties in Moscow on June 7, 1969, signalled a major change in Soviet policy. The Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the impending American disengagement from Indochina and British withdrawal East of Suez in an attempt to introduce a regional presence that would not be subject to explosions of nationalism in any one country. The proposal was never really defined and was purposely left vague by Soviet officials and commentators to promote its acceptance in