The Soviet Railway System: Policy and Operation

Abstract

IT is probably in the field of railroading that some of the weaker spots of Soviet planning can be most easily detected. It is here, too, that the greatest contrast can be observed between two opposing systems: that of socialism, as it exists in Russia, and that of modern capitalism, based on private, corporate or mixed (private and state) enterprise. In the history of capitalist railroad construction, now largely a thing of the past in the leading industrial countries of the West and the United States, we note that building activities were broadly determined by the requirements of existing markets, which, in turn, were developed and expanded because of newly established communications. By contrast, socialism's aims were motivated from the beginning, and continue to be so, by state planning, masterminded by individuals who retained top positions of power. This appears to be the primary reason why Soviet railway policy, in the light of actual economic experience, appears far less dynamic and flexible than that of capitalist countries. In the history of modern capitalism, railroad construction played a very important part. It greatly affected the circulation of capital, both national and international, the stock market, the real estate market, the market for labor, and both individual and corporate income. It also affected, indirectly but not less actively, the production of industrial goods, especially capital goods, and that of basic raw materials: coal, steel, and others. In this capitalist march towards progress, pre-Communist Russia was no exception. Having already built 14,300 miles of railway track in 20 years between I86I and I882, Imperial Russia built another 32,000 miles in the 30 years between 1882 and the First World War. The Russian achievement in the go's was due to the energy and talents of Serge Witte, an eminent specialist in railroading, and Russia's Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903. In I88i, the