The Soviet Non-Invasion of Poland in 1980-1981 and the End of the Cold War

Abstract

TIE POLISH CRISIS OF 1980-1981, precipitated by the emergence of the anti-communist 'Solidarity' movement, was the last time the Soviet control of Eastern Europe was challenged before the communist regimes in the area and eventually the Soviet state itself collapsed 10 years later. Yet, unlike on previous such occasions-East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968-the Kremlin abstained from resorting to military force to avert the presumed threat to its vital security interests. Instead the Polish military under General Wojciech Jaruzelski performed this task by itself, thus preventing a radical disruption of the established East-West order in Europe. In the longer perspective, informed by the knowledge of how the Cold War ended, the particular question of whether the imposition of martial law in Poland prevented the greater tragedy of a Soviet invasion relates to the larger question of Moscow's willingness to acquiesce in the incipient dissolution of its empire even while possessing abundant military power to prevent or at least slow down the process. So extraordinary was this behaviour, belying the conventional realist wisdom about states' imperative to defend their power interests, that it cannot be properly understood without taking into account the experience that had preceded it. Newly available archival evidence and previously unheard testimonies by several of the key participants now allow the Polish crisis to be closely examined as a formative experience for the final phase of Soviet policy.' With the benefit of hindsight, the irresistible question is whether in 1980-81 Moscow may already have been prepared to give up its control of Poland and perhaps the rest of Eastern Europe with it, for this was the country that eight years later would give the push that brought down communist rule in the region. Or did the temporary containment of the Polish upheaval without the use of outside force allow the necessary gestation of the subsequent non-violent demise of the Soviet superpower? In any case, did Moscow seriously contemplate a military intervention in Poland at any time in 1980-81, and if so, why did it not take place? Whatever the answers, they reflect not only on the utility of Soviet military power, then at the peak of its expansion, but also on the constraints on the use of military power in general for pursuing political goals in the security environment shaped by the Cold War at its terminal stage. In that unique environment, how did perceptions and misperceptions influence Soviet decisions? Were Kremlin leaders responsive to