Abstract

Abstract : Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. led military alliance against Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in 1990-91, is undergoing examination by military analysts across the globe. The war occurred at the same time as the domestic crisis over reform of the Soviet system, and especially its military, was moving to a peak. Accordingly, the Soviet military discussion of the war reveals both the fissures between reformers and conservatives in early 1991 and the 'lessons learned' by Soviet observers concerning modern and future war. Inasmuch as this study was completed before the August revolution that followed the failed coup of August 19, it might seem that such discussions are forever irrelevant. But the strategic problems confronting the military and its civilian critics will not simply go away due to the revolution, though major changes certainly are occurring and will occur. Accordingly the professional Soviet military and its civilian commanders will necessarily sooner or later have to respond to the challenges of war 'in the third dimension' and high-tech conventional strike systems one way or another. Given the sophistication of Soviet military thinking and its lasting importance for military strategy and policy, the outcome of this continuing learning process cannot but have important repercussions for U.S. military thinking and policy.

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