Abstract
AbstractIn the 1970s the Soviet Union became a major importer of grain, giving rise to fears that it could extract an undue share of the gains from East‐West trade through the monopsonistic power of its state‐trading organs and by keeping its buying intentions secret. Offer curves depicting Soviet trade are constructed using two alternative characterizations of Soviet trade decision making. We show that the grain agreement between the two countries negates most of the bargaining advantage attributed to the Soviet trade monopoly and may open the Soviet Union to exploitation by the United States.
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