The Southern Pacific, 1901–1985 by Don L. Hofsommer

Abstract

310 Book Reviews TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE principle around which to organize this mass of evidence, even if it were only something as simple as Smith’s division of labor. Occasion­ ally, too, Simmons’s lack ofinterest in economics and economic history leads him to overhasty conclusions. He argues strongly for the prof­ itability of some rural lines, but his claims are based almost entirely on figures for receipts, and he presents no evidence about costs. Despite these reservations, this is a lively book, packed with useful information, by one of the best of Britain’s railway historians. P. J. Cain Dr. Cain is senior lecturer in economic history at the University of Birmingham. He has written a number of articles on the economic history of British railways for journals including Economic History Review and Business History. The Southern Pacific, 1901—1985. By Don L. Hofsommer. College Sta­ tion: Texas A&M University Press, 1986. Pp. xviii + 373; illustra­ tions, maps, notes, bibliography, index. $44.50. Available from Golden West Books, P.O. Box 80250, San Marino, Calif. 91108; include $1.50 handling. Don L. Hofsommer has written a detailed history of a giant western railway that in 1901 controlled 8,206 route miles stretching from Portland to New Orleans and a steamship line linking New Orleans and New York. After Collis P. Huntington, the last of the Big Four who completed the Central Pacific in 1869, died in 1900, control of the Southern Pacific shifted to Edward H. Harriman. When Harriman acquired the Southern Pacific in 1901, he said: “We have bought not only a railroad, but an empire” (p. 13). At the turn of the century many people, especially those who read The Octopus by Frank Norris, viewed the Southern Pacific as an evil empire. Certainly Harriman, who had upgraded his earlier-acquired Union Pacific and Illinois Cen­ tral, made major improvements in the route and equipment of the Southern Pacific. Harriman also helped halt the vagrant flow of the lower Colorado River and gave assistance after the San Francisco earthquake and fire. In 1913, four years after the death of Harriman, the U.S. Supreme Court decreed that the Union Pacific had to dispose of all of its Southern Pacific stock. Julius Kruttschnitt, a longtime lieutenant to Harriman, guided the now-independent Southern Pa­ cific during World War I and the early 1920s. The Southern Pacific was a prosperous railroad during the decade of the twenties, with a balance sheet showing assets of $2 billion, more than 13,500 miles of railway and 3,800 miles of water service, some 96,000 employees, and 58,000 stockholders receiving 6 percent dividends. The economic picture quickly changed in the dark 1930s. The Depression pushed Southern Pacific freight tonnage in 1933 down to the level of 1906, the employee roster to less than half that of the TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE Book Reviews 311 mid-twenties, and company earnings so low they even failed to cover fixed charges. With vigorous cost cutting and some aid from federal agencies, the railroad managed to avoid receivership. The defense buildup in the last years of the decade boosted traffic, and by Pearl Harbor shortages both in labor and equipment were appearing on the Southern Pacific. Between 1940 and 1944, the wartime freight traffic doubled in volume, and in 1944 about two-thirds of all pas­ senger traffic was from the military. The prosperity of World War II allowed the Southern Pacific by the end of the war to reduce its funded debt by a quarter and also to resume dividends on the common stock. During the years that Donald J. Russell was either president or chair­ man ofthe Southern Pacific (1952—72), the road continued to prosper. Time called the road “aggressively modern,” and Forbes in 1965 claimed it was “one of the best-run railroads in the U.S.” (p. 255). By 1980 increased competition from the Burlington Northern and an enlarged Union Pacific made the Southern Pacific consider a possible merger. In 1983 the Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe agreed to merge, but the Interstate Commerce Commission refused to approve the consolidation. Hofsommer gives particular attention to the managerial decisions of such top...