The South China Sea Disputes: Implications of China's Earlier Territorial Settlements

Abstract

ALT HOUGH final conclusions would be premature, the approach Beiing has adopted toward the South China Sea territorial disputes appears to follow the same tack taken in earlier disputes. Over the course of this particular dispute, China has used military force to occupy disputed territory, but at the same time Beijing has indicated a willingness to seek a peaceful settlement and has participated in conferences that have explored alternative solutions, including joint development of the region's natural resources. In the meantime, however, China is holding firm to its sovereignty claim and continues to develop its military capabilities. While the PRC has occupied several islands in the Paracels (Xisha) since the 1970s, Beijing has stationed naval forces on Woody Island, the largest island in the group, since 1991; and Chinese officials have confirmed recent satellite reconnaissance that shows a 2,600-metre runway on the island.' Beijing also seeks to acquire an aircraft carrier and other capabilities that will enhance its ability to project force into the region. A recent government publication, Military Secrets, declared it is a top priority for China to have air support for the possible battle in the Spratly Islands. Further, there is a report that an airstrip is under construction on one of the Beijing-occupied islands in the Spratlys.2 Although the actual capability to project force into the region has not yet been fully realized, Beijing's intentions to acquire the capability are a significant development. The military buildup in the South China Sea does not necessarily indicate that Beijing will use force to occupy more islands, but rather that Beijing seeks to enhance its military presence to augment its bargaining leverage in future negotiations. It can also be argued that China's behav-